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CHANGING THE SUBJECT: COGNITIVE THEORY
AND THE TEACHING OF LAW*
Jeremy Pault
I. FORMALISM V. ANTI-FORMALISM: CUTTING DowN THE
TREES
For those of us teaching legal theory to American law
students at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Steven
Winter's book, A Clearing in the Forest, Law, Life, and Mind,
has arrived just in time. It offers a path (to use one of Professor
Winter's journey metaphors) out of our oldest and least fruitful
debates. Consider the following thumbnail sketch of the central
questions within contemporary academic discussion.
Does law satisfactorily constrain judicial decision-
makers so that it makes sense to say that citizens in a
contemporary democracy are both authors of the law that
governs them and subject to the rule of law they have
authored? Given the crucial nature of this question to the
legitimacy of the legal system, it's no surprise that legal
academics mostly answer "yes." The differences occur in
providing the explanation.
On one side, we have the champions of what Michael
Fischl and I have called "the rulebook account,"' but which
typically goes by some variant of the name "formalism." The
* ©2002 Jeremy Paul. All Rights Reserved.
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basic idea here is familiar to every grammar school student.
Law works precisely as the rules of a game.2 We write the rules
down in advance and when a dispute arises we consult the
rules to tell us which side has the better argument. The crucial
issue, and thus the point where debate truly begins, is over the
breadth and scope of the rules. Everyone agrees that some
disputes will arise which have not been adequately anticipated
by the rule drafters. In such cases, the rulebook account won't
fully explain how a judge can make a decision.
But formalists worry little about cases where "the rules
run out" for two reasons. First, the rules will settle a vast
majority of disputes and, as they see it, only those folks
interested in stirring up trouble will keep harping on the
relatively few gaps in the legal rules.3 Second, the system will
contain sufficient institutional checks and balances so that
judicial decision-makers forced to fill in the gaps will seldom do
so in a way fundamentally threatening to the rule of law.
Panels of judges will review initial decisions rendered by a solo
judge. Judges will be chosen through a process, such as Senate
confirmation, that includes a political check ensuring that
judges won't be too far from the mainstream. Judges will be
trained in a culture and chosen for a temperament that
includes a preference for deciding cases in ways that hold the
rules together even when particular disputes call for some
amount of judicial interpretation. Thus, although the rulebook
account requires all the usual qualifiers, it commands the
allegiance of many sophisticated thinkers and has a strangle
hold upon the common citizen's imagination.4
2 For the relevance of games to Winter's overall argument, see his companion
piece in this volume. See Steven L. Winter, When Self-Governance is a Game, 67 Brook.
L. Rev. 1171 (2002).
Consider H.L.A. Hart's famous condemnation of American Legal Realists as
being "pre-occupied with the penumbra." As Hart puts it, every legal rule has a core
(we know a daredevil driving with his eyes closed is negligent or worse) and a
penumbra (what about someone talking on a cell phone while driving). Only fools, Hart
would tell us, would confuse the two situations and treat the latter issue as
characteristic of all legal questions. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-15 (1958).
4 The most sophisticated presentation of contemporary formalism I know is
Frederick Schauer's lucid and insightful Playing by the Rules. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION
MAKING IN LAWS AND LIFE (1991). He recognizes all the problems with formalism
mentioned above yet defends rule application and interpretation as superior to other
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Opponents of formalism are more divided among
themselves, but all begin with the same basic insight.5 Judicial
decision-makers have substantial discretion in determining
what the law is and how it applies to particular disputes. As
Professor Winter describes in an even broader context,6 the
formalist world view bumps up against two distinct difficulties.
First, the judge who makes a good faith attempt to
determine what law applies to a particular dispute has an
enormous array of material to survey. Every appellate decision
is subject to multiple interpretations (e.g., did the court protect
a general right to privacy or a more specific right to use birth
control?). Every statute is subject to multiple readings (should
we read the language literally to bar discrimination in places of
public accommodation or to bar discrimination by any business
even if it has no specific location?). Worse still, every decision
must be read in conjunction with every other decision, every
statute in conjunction with every other statute, and all these
ordinary legal documents must also be squared with
constitutional provisions. Enormous judgment is required to
determine how all these statements of law are meant to fit
together.
Second, even after a judge reaches an interpretation of
existing materials to determine what the law is, all sorts of
additional questions arise in determining how the law actually
applies to the facts. A judge, for example, might carefully read
three landlord/tenant cases together to conclude that the law of
her jurisdiction prohibits a tenant from withholding rent
without first notifying the landlord of a housing code violation.
But the judge would still need to decide whether a note that
reads "my water heats up slowly" is sufficient to suggest that
the heater is broken as opposed to just performing a bit poorly.
Anti-formalists agree that these opportunities for
judicial discretion are substantially greater in number and
significantly more important than the formalists acknowledge.
Accordingly, they see a need for additional theory to make
sense of the familiar liberal faith in "the rule of law." Since the
forms of legal decision-making.
6 Such internal divisions, unsurprisingly, leave the anti-formalist camp far
less effective than one would surmise based on the strength of their arguments.
6 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 8
(2001).
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rules themselves often don't provide determinate answers to
legal questions, anti-formalists must determine how such
answers can be provided. If the hard truth is that judges use
the gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities as an opportunity to
pursue a political agenda that is separate from their allocated
task of applying the law, then the underlying theory of
democracy will be called into question. So, the anti-formalists
agree, the indeterminacy present in determining what the law
is and how it applies to the facts poses a fundamental
challenge to law that formalism itself cannot resolve.
At this point, anti-formalists dissolve into competing
schools that vary across a spectrum depending on their faith in
the ability of judicial discretion to be meaningfully constrained
in the absence of constraint by formal rule. It's okay that
formal law is riddled with indeterminacy, some anti-formalists
tell us, because the judge can then look to economics or more
broadly to "policy science" to fill in gaps with sound reasoning
about what's best for society.7 It's okay that formal law is
riddled with indeterminacy, other anti-formalists tell us,
because interpretive strategies such as those used in literature
or philosophy will allow judges to choose the result most
consistent with existing legal principles.8 It's okay that formal
law is riddled with indeterminacy, still other anti-formalists
tell us, because there's a general societal consensus on the
correct interpretation of the formal law and judges can secure
their legitimacy by reaching for this consensus.9 It's to be
expected, but not quite okay, we hear from some anti-
formalists, that the law is rife with indeterminacy because
judges then fill the gaps with political positions they have
brought to the bench. ° From this view, law is just another form
This is one way to describe the work of the Legal Realists and those in
today's Law and Economics movement. For a brief description of Legal Realism in
these terms with accompanying citations to more extensive accounts, see Richard
Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505,
519-20 (1987). For new insight into the depth and power of law and economics
unhinged from its prior ideological straightjacket, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS AND WELFARE (2002).
'See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
The more sophisticated versions of this approach find consensus not on the
questions that actually face courts but on the proper interpretive techniques or
"disciplining rules" that courts must use to resolve such questions. See, e.g., Owen Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
10 See, e.g., David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
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of politics and emphasizing the indeterminacy of rules helps
point this out. Finally, it's a cruel joke, the extreme anti-
formalists remind us, that the law is riddled with
indeterminacy. Only a fool would fail to notice all the ways that
not only rules but "reasons run out." " Our most sober jurists
are playing a game if they expect us to believe their decisions
are meaningfully constrained in the way we pretend such
decisions must be for law to be legitimate.
And there you have it: a full term's course in
contemporary jurisprudence over-simplified, but not all that
inaccurately summarized, in a few paragraphs. Excluded, as
usual, are more contemporary perspectives such as feminist
jurisprudence and critical race theory, which question whether
it makes sense to seek a universal perspective from which to
view legal problems.'2 Indeed, it's precisely because of the
challenges they raise that feminism and critical race theory are
often taught as separate courses. Traditional theorists most
typical reaction is that these new perspectives have much to
offer but little that untangles the core debate between
formalism and anti-formalism. As we shall see, Professor
Winter's effort to displace the familiar questions of formalism
helps validate the significance of feminism and critical race
theory as central to the core of legal theory. Professor Winter
makes this explicit in his chapter on narrative where he
illustrates how traditionalists have unfairly criticized and
marginalized the work of Patricia Williams.3 But to get there
Professor Winter must first take us out of the seemingly
interminable debate over formalism's vices and virtues.
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 17 (David Kairys ed., 1982); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (fin de siecle) (1997) (arguing that judges are powerfully influenced by
their own ideological positions along the liberal/conservative spectrum and that judges
are often in denial about this).
" No one does extreme anti-formalism better than Pierre Schlag. For his
brilliant demonstration of how and why reasons run out, see PIERRE SCHLAG, THE
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
12 See generally Anne Comer Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102
YALE L.J. 1265 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (describing how both
dominance and relational feminism question a universalist perspective and raising
provocative questions about how the challenge to universalism can be turned upon
feminism itself); CRITICAL RACE THEORY xv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (describing the
theme of collected essays as replacing universalism with a "call to context").
13 WINTER, supra note 6, at 131-38.
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Given the overwhelming appeal of formalism, no one
believes its champions will ever give up striving for continually
refined models in which rule-following is core and all else
periphery. Given the numerous embarrassments to formalism,
no one believes its opponents will tire of pointing out the
absurdity of expecting legal language to provide binding
constraint. Legal theory teachers are thus reduced to the task
of familiarizing our students with all sides of the debate and
leaving them to develop their own philosophy. In doing so, we
abandon them in an environment in which each of the
available choices appears so obviously flawed as to be
unworthy of allegiance for any but the most dogmatic thinkers.
No wonder so many conclude that theory must have little to do
with law practice and that jurisprudential debates are beyond
understanding or interest.
Professor Winter is out to change all this. His argument
begins with noticing the premises shared by formalists and
anti-formalists alike. As Winter explains, both sides agree that
the literal application of rules would represent the simple most
elegant way in which law could meaningfully constrain human
behavior. Formalists cling to the idea that law actually works
this way. Anti-formalists often lament that rules fail to
constrain judicial discretion and thus offer a series of
supplementary techniques designed to shore up the rule-based
account. Winter is perhaps a little too quick to ignore all the
ways that anti-formalists actually prefer the techniques they
offer. Law and economics devotees, for example, are not
necessarily formalists at heart. But, Winter's insight is
nonetheless crucial. The rule-based account of law that seems
so commonsensical to formalist and anti-formalist alike
deserves serious scrutiny to determine whether it stands up to
our best understandings of how people process information and
to what we know about law in actual practice. Winter argues
convincingly that in this light the debate between formalism
and anti-formalism loses most of its bite.
14
It is possible to provide a flavor for Winter's approach
without exploring issues with the depth that he does. Take any
of the hundreds of puzzles within legal doctrine that have long
bedeviled legal theorists (Winter discusses several). For our
14 WINTER, supra note 6, at xvi-xvii, 6-12, 187-89.
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purposes, we can consider, as Winter does to great effect in
Chapter 10, the constitutional guarantee against laws
abridging freedom of speech or of the press. 5 With a formalist
account, we would begin and mostly end with the
constitutional language as a source of guidance on how to
resolve certain situations. What are we to do, however, with
problems such as laws banning flag burning or nude dancing?
Such statutes clearly seem to implicate First Amendment
concerns. Yet who could miss the problem that these laws
appear to prohibit conduct rather than speech? With a literal
reading the Constitution might appear inapplicable to these
obvious efforts by government to restrict communication.
Actual case law, however, is well up to the challenge of moving
beyond literalism to a more purposive constitutional
interpretation. Here then the anti-formalists pounce. The
Court's willingness to expand constitutional guarantees means
that something well beyond formalism is going on. Since all
conduct can be described as communicative (perhaps I mean to
send a message when I bust your chops), there is no coherent
way to draw linguistic lines between constitutionally-protected
speech/communication and constitutionally-unprotected
conduct. It is just one short step then to the broader conclusion
that what is driving the cases is a judicial, dare we say
political, discretion divorced or disconnected from doctrinal
analysis.
One short step, Professor Winter might agree. But a
wrong one. As Winter argues, the fact that legal language
cannot constrain outcomes in the way formalists hope does not
prove that language cannot constrain outcomes in the way that
matters most. 6 We are not surprised, he might stress, when a
court immediately and without reflection denies a First
Amendment claim raised by a kidnapper who argues he only
"borrowed" the child to "make a statement."17 Nor should a
court pause long over protecting a citizen's rights to act out a
mime in a public park even though no speech is involved. What
stabilizes these clear results is current social understandings
15Id. at 273-86.
" Id. at 153, 191.
17 See id at 283 (making a similar point using Oklahoma City bombing
example).
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about the way our world works. Although such understandings
are constantly in flux, at any given moment certain efforts to
draw the line between speech and conduct will appear
plausible and others less so. Thus, despite our collective
inability to create rigid categories of protected speech and
unprotected action, judges can continue to render decisions
that as Winter might describe it "make sense" to us.
Accordingly, we can make quite accurate predictions about the
kinds of decisions courts will make without being able to
explain those decisions in absolute or formalist terms.
How are such predictions possible? This crucial question
moves us to the heart of why Winter's book is such a marvelous
contribution, indeed a crucial re-direction of tired
jurisprudential debate. As we shall see, what Winter does is no
less sweeping than propose a different way of explaining
human thought. He turns to developments in linguistics and
cognitive theory to argue that it's quite possible for us to
understand a word, a category, or a legal rule as constraining
meaning or outcomes without determining them. If carried to
conclusion, such a view would be like the Rosetta stone of legal
theory. That's because almost all observers of the
contemporary legal scene agree that formalism is riddled with
problems, yet no one has a convincing explanation for why the
public continues to be relatively unconcerned (at least prior to
Bush v. Gore18) that we have rogue judges dispensing nothing
but political justice.
As I teased him at our Brooklyn Law School conference,
A Clearing in the Forest is written in the narrative structure
that Winter untangles in Chapter 5. Thus, Winter's verbal
encounter with those in other disciplines leaves him with a
new weapon. He then proceeds on his journey through legal
theory by using his new weapon to reject both halves of the
legal academy's Hobson's choice. Winter joins the anti-
formalists in concluding that existing legal materials provide
plenty of room for multiple interpretations, meaningful
disagreement, and social progress. But he is with the
formalists in finding that the legal materials are sufficiently
constraining so that the law performs the tasks we most
is 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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rightly expect from it: clarifying, guiding, and modifying
human conduct.19
Winter performs this seemingly magical feat with the
introduction of several concepts. First, he broadens our
understanding of the process of categorization. One way to
think about categories is along the lines that Winter calls the
rationalist model." For rationalists, placing an item in a
category involves determining whether it has the necessary
and sufficient attributes to warrant being so labeled. A square,
for example, is a four-sided figure with each of the sides having
the same length and each angle having ninety degrees. This
form of categorization holds the following promise for a
formalist approach to law. The law might set forth certain
consequences that will occur when a set of facts properly falls
within a legal category. For example, a signed document
indicating mutual assent to terms involving a bargained-for
exchange might constitute a "contract." A judge's job, thinking
back to the rulebook account, will be to determine whether the
set of facts before her have the necessary attributes. If so, a
contract is present and certain legal consequences will flow.
As we all know, however, this type of formalism suffers
from the familiar problem that it is very difficult to squeeze
recalcitrant facts into formal categories. Might a deal be a
contract even if it's not in writing? The formalist response is to
write more rules, clarify, and not worry too much about the
hard cases. The anti-formalist response is to draw attention to
formalism's failure to deliver and crow about the necessary
injection of "policy" (celebratory) or "politics" (condemnatory)
into judging.
Here is Winter's view: Categories are more complex
than simply the specification of necessary and sufficient
attributes. He shows instead how categories are viewed better
through the lens of cognitive theory. From the rationalist
standpoint, a robin and a penguin are equally birds. They both
have the required attributes. But ask people at random to
name a bird and many more will name a robin than a penguin.
Winter explains that such "prototype effects" play a major role
9 WINTER, supra note 6, at 158-60, 329-30.20Id. at 8,12.
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in explaining human categorization.2' We very often proceed
from a central case outward rather than attempting to
determine category fit through a list of attributes. Winter
nicely provides the example of the category "mother," which he
notes may one day have had a central case of the married,
stay-at-home mom who gave birth to and then nurtured her
and her husband's biological children.22 This central case, of
course, is entirely socially contingent. But think of the issues
raised then by the phrases "birth mother," "adoptive mother,"
"genetic mother," "foster mother," and "stepmother." Such
radial categories are much more common within language than
the earlier example of the square. Each has certain connections
to the core idea of "mother" but each also has differences.
The key point is that it's unsurprising that the
categories used in legal rules don't often precisely fit the facts.
Indeed, we should expect that judges will encounter situations
where there's doubt about the applicability of legal categories
because that's how language works. Moreover, language works
that way, Winter continues, because it reflects the basic
cognitive apparatus with which humans encounter the world.
We use categories because they are useful to us, and since the
world is constantly changing, we must be able to adapt those
categories to fit new situations.
Winter's points about categorization would alone be
sufficient to have launched legal theory in a promising new
direction. We have long asked: If the legal materials
themselves cannot formally dictate outcomes in many legal
disputes, what kind of thought process do judges employ to
determine those outcomes? It's not much of an answer to say
judges rely on hunches.2 Nor can we learn much from a theory
that says judges make the materials the best they can be.24
Just what way is that? Winter proposes that recent
developments in cognitive theory tell us a great deal about the
kinds of arguments which judges will and will not find
plausible.25 Accordingly, Winter goes well beyond his discussion
of categorization to introduce us to a new vocabulary for
21 Id. at 76-86.
22 Id. at 26, 100-01, 189-90.
2Id. at 157-58 (citing Hutchinson).
24 WINTER, supra note 6, at 129 (citing Dworkin).
" Id. at 248-53.
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understanding human thought and thus a new set of tools for
predicting which arguments are likely to resonate with judges.
Readers of this law review will have to read Winter's
book for themselves to gain a full grasp of this vocabulary.
After all, if it could be summarized in a paragraph, why would
Winter have needed to write the whole book? But the core idea
is that human thought patterns stem from our situation as
embodied beings encountering a treacherous world. It's not
surprising then that we move from concrete experiences such
as the power of standing erect to abstract metaphors such as
the idea of standing in court.6 Equally important is our
experience as social beings in which we assimilate information
in terms of idealized cognitive models to make sense of our
world. Accordingly, arguments that seem perfectly rational
when viewed from the perspective of someone unfamiliar with
our culture may be rejected promptly by judges steeped in
American lore.
I constantly tell my students that the National
Basketball Association ("NBA") should require at least two
women to play on the court at all times. Choosing only men is
clearly discriminatory and violates Title VII. The NBA rebuttal
that the men are better players begs the question: In what
sense are they better? If what's meant is that they perform
better on the court, this is illogical. Since the game is
competitive, as long as the other team also has two women, no
team will suffer competitively. If by contrast what's meant by
better is that the fans prefer to see all men, and thus will pay
more for the games, this also is not definitive. Courts long ago
rejected the "customer preference" defense when airlines
argued that their business clients preferred young, attractive
flight attendants.27 I have yet to hear an argument that
persuades me to give up my Don Quixote quest for co-ed
basketball. But Winter's work urges me to focus instead on
how I know my task is futile, at least in the short run. It's not
because my argument is illogical. Instead, it's because
society-and judges-in our culture reflexively experience
26 For Winter's magisterial and still unequaled treatment of the relationship
between law and metaphor, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1391 (1988).
27 Wilson v. S.W. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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sporting events as gender segregated and find this perfectly
natural. In the long run, I might change hearts and minds. But
only then will the law follow.
When arguing that we can better predict judicial
outcomes if we understand embodied thinking and socially
contingent, idealized cognitive models .Winter's book will
produce two common misreadings. Let's dispense with them
here. Winter is not calling for a return to modified formalism.
He believes that judges will find themselves constrained by the
categories and rules established in legal materials. A judge
cannot credibly hold an executive liable for sexual harassment
if he smiles more often when his secretary wears attractive
clothes. But Winter never argues that the word harassment,
which one might find in a statute or precedent, isn't big enough
to accommodate such an interpretation. In other words, it's not
the legal materials alone that provide the constraint. It's what
we have been taught collectively about our society and the
kinds of things that might legitimately be found actionable.
Neither is Winter arguing that all is right with the
world because courts will interpret ambiguous legal materials
in line with a general societal consensus. His is not a
Panglossian view, and he is fully aware that many issues in
our culture are deeply contested. Rather, his point is that a
thorough study of methods of conceptualization will tell us a
great deal about whether certain arguments might resonate
with judges who most typically come from the dominant parts
of the culture. As Winter would describe it, there is plenty of
room for innovation and imagination within the law. But
arguments that ask judges to invent doctrines out of whole
cloth are not consistent with the practice of law as he has seen
it. Indeed, the resistance of judges to think outside the
idealized cognitive models Winter describes leaves Winter
quite sober about how gaps in the law will be filled. For one
thing, gaps will often go unrecognized, since judges will fail
even to comprehend the quite logical arguments challenging
their point of view.28 And, when judges do see a gap, the
consensus they search for will as often be conventional wisdom
2 8 Winter provides a nice example of this when discussing the Supreme Court
majority's inability to grasp Justice White's argument in dissent in Immigration &
Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). WINTER, supra note 6, at 245-53.
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as an actual consensus. Compare, for example, the reaction of
the nation's journalists to the Monica Lewinsky scandal (a
president who lies must go) with the more measured reaction
of the voting public.'
So, to return to the theme with which we began,
Winter's emphasis on a broadened concept of human
rationality, on a flexible, adaptive view toward categories,
offers us a fresh take on the formalism/anti-formalism debate.
With Winter's view, law can have its cake and eat it, too. It can
be constrained and flexible, adaptive yet not reductively
political, imaginative without being whimsical. To repeat, this
does not leave Winter endorsing anything like our current legal
system or any particular outcomes. But it does leave him a
more credible defender of the rule of law than any other writer
I know.
II. EXPANDING THE COGNITIVE FRONTIER
As a fan of Winter's work, I want to use the rest of this
Essay to explore the ways in which I think A Clearing in the
Forest poses questions that should engage legal theory for a
good long time to come. Above all, Winter is to be
congratulated for bringing renewed focus to the question of
how judges are actually persuaded, rather than leaving us
languishing in the failures of formalism. To avoid the role of
unabashed cheerleader, however, let me first describe two
ways in which I believe Winter might yet improve on the
account of law provided here.
Let's talk first about the enemy Winter claims to be
vanquishing. He asserts that lawyers, judges, philosophers,
etc., have fallen victim to a reductionist view of rationality."
Over and over again Winter shows how sophisticated thinkers
Noted columnist Frank Rich summarized it this way, "From the moment
Mr. Clinton first wagged his finger about 'that woman' a majority of the public judged
him a lying philanderer-even as they came to the parallel conclusion that his
scandalous behavior shouldn't force him from office. Though the Washington
establishment would eventually be driven bananas by the compartmentalization of
those two opposed ideas, Americans beyond the Beltway, possessed of first-rate
intelligence, shrugged it off. And the country functioned just fine." Frank Rich, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A19.So For a description of the reductionist view, see WINTER, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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make errors by trying to solve complex category problems with
formal technical lines. For example, Chapter 11 does a
wonderful job of critiquing a Supreme Court decision on
perjury by pointing out how the Court was in the throes of a
literalist (as opposed to a socially-grounded) view of the notion
of a lie. 1 Indeed, much of the book's very hard work is its
painstaking care in explaining so many important aspects of
law (rules, analogies, doctrinal shifts) in terms of a struggle
between the rationalist model and the newer, more
sophisticated, cognitive approach. (Winter means it when he
invokes the "rational argument is war" metaphor.)32
From my vantage point, however, this structure is a
remnant of precisely the kind of thinking Winter is trying to
transcend. Are we not running the risk of embracing a p and
not-p structure (like the kind we saw in the definition of a
square) when we so sharply contrast the rationalist model with
a more cognitive approach? And there's a second mystery.
Where exactly does this primitive rationalist model come from?
Winter details the model as though it was built mostly by
sophisticated lawyers, philosophers, and legal thinkers
bumbling about trying to make sense of their jobs. Too often for
my taste he contrasts their mistaken views with the deeper
truth of "common sense."33 But, of course, the rest of the book
describes most sophisticated models of thought as built from
the ground up.
It's worth asking then whether the rationalist model
that Winter wants to replace in fact serves important social
functions. A great deal of cognitive space, for example, is saved
when we pretend our categories are open and shut. And, the
human ability to manipulate categories that Winter so
brilliantly describes develops over time and can be dangerous if
it comes too early either in a lifetime or in the life of an
institution. Imagine the inner smile a parent might feel when
31 WINTER, supra note 6, at 297-309. I agree with Winter that the Court was
wrong in Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), to reverse the defendant's
perjury conviction. Certainly it is a misleading response to the question: Do you have a
bank account in Bank X to answer "the company has an account there," when you
know you also have a personal account there. Whether the Court was lulled by the
rationalist model or just generally loathe to find criminal liability in cases of doubt is
much less clear to me.
32 WINTER, supra note 6, at 112.33 Id. at 309.
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he asks his young child why she didn't pick up the lost $100
bill before the wind took it too far away. "Daddy," she replies,
"you told me never to go in the road."
Perhaps one way to describe our situation using
Winter's own terminology would be to see the rationalist notion
of categorization as a product of "prototype effects."34 Just as
Winter sees a dining room chair as more representative of a
chair than a beanbag, perhaps the binary category forms the
core or prototype of our notion of category. The point would not
be so much to re-orient the lines of future inquiry into the
nature of law. We want as much as possible to change the
subject to focus on the complex thought processes that decision-
makers and law creators go through as law is made and
applied. But Winter's entire book is aimed at the process of
"antinomial capture" (faith in rules or needless dismay over
rules' inadequacies) that has allegedly blinded judges and legal
scholars alike. Think what an addition it would be to chart the
source of this rampant misconception.
My second quibble goes deeper into the heart of
Winter's approach. For several reasons, I am much less
persuaded than he is that cognitive theory rescues us from the
long-standing preoccupations of the anti-formalists. Let's take
for granted (and I have no trouble with this) that cognitive
theory provides a sound antidote to concerns that a "rogue
judge" will ignore the law and instead opt to impose his or her
political predilections on an unsuspecting public. Is this really
the problem that has led realists and critical legal scholars to
focus on indeterminacy in law?
Winter argues that in most cases, judges will be
restricted to only those interpretations of the existing legal
materials that find resonance in the social practices of the
community.35 True enough. He also notes that only a deeply
fractured community need fear that judges will fail to maintain
some sort of stability even as they alter the legal landscape to
fit changing social reality. 6 Fine. The question, however, is
ought we to turn ourselves over to the particular kind of
34 Id. at 76-86.
'RId. at 327-31.
"Id. at 329.
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stability etched for us by the judges who happen to have
clawed their way into judicial robes?
The conventional answer, and the one Winter and all
anti-formalists reject, is that the legal materials themselves
are sufficiently binding that a judge in good faith should reach
the same outcome in most cases. With this long since
discredited view, it almost doesn't matter who makes it to the
bench. Once we all agree, however, that the legal materials are
sufficiently indeterminate so as to create room for judicial
discretion, why should we be at all comforted by the fact that
the room created is not infinite or open-ended?
Winter says that the indeterminacy is there but that
judges can be counted on to use it in more or less predictable
ways." This claim, however, needs much more elaboration. In
his book, Winter shows convincingly that there are cognitive
structures and patterns that can be helpful in explaining why
some alternatives were more likely to be adopted than others.
But this is too easy a target. Even the most vocal proponents of
legal indeterminacy have long agreed that law is often
predictable.38 It is not enough then to provide compelling
reconstructions of famous opinions such as Justice Hughes'
argument in Jones v. Laughlin.39 If I am a strong opponent of
federal power, will I really be comforted to know that the
metaphors Justice Hughes adopts to bring about my undoing
have a basis in changing social reality? Suppose I am deeply
troubled by such changes and view the courts as my best hope
to turn things back in my direction?
The general point is that the anti-formalist critique
begins not with the idea that there are an infinite number of
plausible positions in a legal dispute, but that there are at
least two. Moreover, in many cases the two positions will line
up with deeper disputes within society. If the judge who makes
the choice can find plausible arguments within the existing
culture for either of those two positions, what difference does it
make to the losing side that many other positions were
foreclosed to the judge as a result of cognitive constraint? Now
37 Id. at 152-54.
'8 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1984).
39 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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it may be a more viable political strategy to focus on how to
change the judge's mind than to spend time demonstrating
over and over again that the judge is making a political choice.
But this is a much more interesting argument than an
approach faulting the critics for overstating the nature of
indeterminacy.
Moreover, the anti-formalists are troubled by concerns
that receive too little emphasis when we repeatedly paint
judges as trying to "make sense" of the case before them.
Imagine, for example, a fact pattern in which a supervisor
makes a few inappropriate and suggestive remarks to his
female employee, sends her flowers on her birthday, asks her
out once but takes no for an answer, and then passes her over
for a promotion. If she sues under Title VII, it might be
plausible to treat the various incidents as isolated or as part of
a pattern, and to treat the denied promotion as connected to or
wholly independent of the other activity.
A Clearing in the Forest provides us a wonderful new
lens through which to litigate such a case. As the woman's
lawyer, one might try as hard as possible to make the facts fit
with what Winter might refer to as the idealized cognitive
model of harassment." Here the key would be to fit the facts as
closely as one could to a "quid pro quo sex for advancement"
narrative. A subsequent retrospective view of a judicial opinion
denying her claim might also look for ways in which the judge
was not convinced that the case resembled a familiar idealized
cognitive model ("ICM").
Yet, of course, another possibility is that the judge in
question is generally hostile to all sexual harassment claims
and will do whatever he can to interpret an ambiguous
situation against the woman. In this case, Winter might say
that the law was entirely "determinate" in that one could have
predicted the woman would lose. But the power afforded to
such a "biased" judge is an understandable concern.
Additionally, a legal system that afforded the judge a platform
to write an opinion that purportedly "makes sense" of the
outcome could be a source of genuine and legitimate anger.
40 For a discussion of idealized models which relies heavily on the work of
George Lakoff, see WINTER, supra note 6, at 88.
1003
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
Generalizing from this example, one might say that
Winter and other anti-formalists both have valid standpoints
from which to criticize judicial outcomes. The familiar anti-
formalist position is that indeterminacy in the legal materials
leaves judges room to import outside political views. The judge
who is hostile to harassment, for example, might be more likely
to see a series of "isolated incidents" than a coherent pattern of
inappropriate conduct. Winter rightly calls our attention to the
opposite side of the coin. The categories we call upon judges to
determine and the decisions we ask them to make often
already reflect many of the deeper values at stake. Our judge,
for example, may actually be hostile to harassment claims
precisely because he tends to believe women see patterns
where men do not intend them. Thus, his so-called politics may
come from his "making sense" of the facts rather than his effort
to impose a vision onto an ambiguous narrative. I applaud
Winter for emphasizing the importance of this standpoint. But
I think he makes a mistake to so quickly dismiss the more
garden-variety fears of political manipulation that dominate
the work of many other legal theorists.
Nor would I want to lose the critical bite available to
anti-formalists who highlight judicial flip-flops on matters of
method. Suppose, for example, that a particular judge writes a
great opinion in one case showing how a series of seemingly
isolated comments actually form a pattern of behavior that
constitute assent to a commercial contract. This same judge
then rejects an effort to link together a similar pattern of
incidents in the context of a sexual harassment case. I would
find enormous value in the kind of analysis Winter might do in
showing how the nuances of the cases and the available
idealized cognitive models might have made it perfectly
predictable that the judge would rule one way in one case and
one way in the other. But I would also be thrilled to read a
stinging critique of the judge for politically manipulating facts
to get his way in both instances.
A final point along these lines would be to ask Winter
for additional help with the aspect of judicial opinions that the
realists have forever added to our legal culture, the emphasis
on future consequences. The familiar point is that judges in
doubt over the meaning of the legal rules will shift focus to
consider the real world impact of a decision one way or the
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other. Take, for example, the current issue under discussion
concerning whether the attack on the World Trade Center was
one incident or two.4' Suppose a judge in good conscience
decides this could be interpreted either way and thus rules for
the insured on grounds that the consequences to the insured
would be more severe if the per incident cap barred total
recovery. Another judge might agree that the issue could go
either way but would have ruled for the insurance companies
so as to stabilize prices in the insurance market. Winter's
analysis would lead us rightly to conclude that in a certain
sense such policy concerns are involved in every case, not just
the rare events of September 11. That's because the meaning of
each legal rule depends on context and the context always
includes the future consequences of a decision either way. How
then will cognitive theory help us to predict the role of
consequentialist analysis in legal decision making?
These quibbles aside, or perhaps because of them, the
easiest thing to say about the breathtaking scope of A Clearing
in the Forest is that it paves the way for new topics of inquiry
into the nature of legal decision making and offers hints at a
whole new agenda for the teachers of law. To this latter topic I
now turn.
III. TEACHING LAW DIFFERENTLY: PLANTING COGNITIVE
SEEDS
Consider the following straightforward assessment of
what it means to teach law: Law is impossible if it cannot be
communicated from one person to another and from the state
to its citizens. Verbal and written language are the
predominant, if not exclusive, forms for the communication of
law. Accordingly, to succeed, law teachers must devote
considerable time teaching students about the nature, origins,
properties, strengths, and weaknesses of language.
Or consider the slightly more complex but equally
irrefutable argument: Law is unworthy of university study
41 According to newspaper accounts $3.6 billion turns on whether insurers may
properly invoke the cap on liability per occurrence or whether this cap must be paid
twice, once for each event. See Jonathan D. Glater, Trade Center Leaseholder Sues a
Big Reinsurer, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2001, at B1.
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unless it aims to link the existing rules governing human
conduct with some notion of what those rules ought, in
fairness, to be. In short, law, if not each individual lawyer,
must strive for some form of justice. Justice, however, is an
elusive concept whose analysis depends on delving deeply into
the nature of persons. How do individuals come to have a
concept of justice? What forms of reasoning lead us to
distinguish between what is and what ought to be? There may
be no answers to such questions, but certainly one could not
really grasp the enterprise of law if one failed to ask them.
Accordingly, to succeed, law teachers must develop a
curriculum and method of instruction that directly addresses
questions of human nature and human psychology.
These arguments are not new. They were well
understood by many during the heyday of legal realism.
Roberto Unger's 1975 Knowledge and Politics42 was a tour de
force performance convincingly returning us to the
impossibility of separating legal and political questions from
more epistemological and philosophical ones. As should be
clear from my description in Part I, A Clearing in the Forest
deserves a proud place in this cognitive tradition for having
added considerable depth and countless insights. Winter wants
to change the subject of discussion from whether the law works
as its theoretical defenders suggest, to how legal rules work the
way its practitioners observe. 3 For law teachers such a shift
should have dramatic consequences for how we introduce
students to law and what topics we emphasize. Human
tendencies that ground and shape our ability to construct legal
and normative systems might replace common law doctrines as
the core of the law school's first year.
Our current law school curriculum divides legal issues
around what Professor Winter might describe as idealized
cognitive models of basic human interactions. So we imagine a
readily understandable deal between a buyer and seller and
fashion a course in contracts, a readily understandable injury
caused by a stranger and fashion a course in torts, and so on.
4
' ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
This is the theme of his discussion of narrative (chapter 5), case analysis
(chapters 6 & 7), rules (chapter 8), analogical reasoning (chapter 9), and statutory
interpretation (chapter 11). WINTER, supra note 6, at 104-38, 139-85, 186-222, 296-331.
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Notice, however, that even these most traditional courses are
taught in ways that belie the formalist approach to law. No one
teaches as if simply learning legal rules was key to successful
practice. It is commonplace instead that law school is about
teaching our students how to "think like a lawyer." Almost as
commonplace is the wry observation that, however often we
say this, we provide precious little content about what it
means.
Winter's turn to cognitive theory presents us with an
opportunity and a vocabulary to change all this. Take, for
example, his sustained focus on the process of categorization.
The fashioning, re-fashioning, and interpretation of categories
cuts across all legal doctrines. Yet, although our students
spend three years watching us pull categories apart, we rarely
do them the favor of providing names for the familiar problems
with categorization that they will face as lawyers or that
judges face when deciding cases. Occasionally we define
important interpretive techniques such as narrowing and
broadening a holding in an appellate case. But seldom do we
show the application of such techniques in a systematic
fashion. Nor do we identify thought structures that make
certain narrowing of cases likely to be more persuasive than
others. No wonder our students are shocked when our lengthy
exam hypotheticals call upon them to apply legal reasoning
techniques to issues they have never quite faced before."
What would law teaching look like if we were to make
the following reversal of our customary approach, or what
Professor Winter might call a gestalt switch?"5 We could move
the traditional doctrinal categories of tort, property, contracts,
administrative law, constitutional law, etc., into the
background. They are, after all, a historical artifact attempting
to find the appropriate level of abstraction from appellate cases
to give law a more universal and scientific feel. Our goal now
"Michael Fischl and I attempt to remedy this surprising gap in law teaching
with a sustained analysis of the patterns in legal argument that create the opportunity
for professors to build so many ambiguities into exam questions. Fischl & Paul, supra
note 1, at 21-193. As will become clear from the text, I view our project and Professor
Winter's as close cousins. All three of us see thought patterns and structures of
argument not as the exclusive preserve of fancy theory courses but as at the absolute
core of law practice and any sound legal education.
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991).
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would be to abstract from the problems of lawyering and
judging in a different way. So we would move into the
foreground the complex and familiar riddles that decision-
makers encounter when attempting to impose orderly law on
disorderly life.
This is much less radical that it sounds when one
considers that most law schools have long offered courses in
statutory interpretation, courses that adopt precisely the kind
of cross-cutting strategy to which I refer. Many law schools also
put one course into the first year, sometimes called Elements of
the Law, aimed at looking across doctrinal boundaries."
Because such courses are an anomaly, however, students often
treat them as a necessary evil to be overcome so they can get
back to real work. It's interesting that despite the widespread
adoption of both types of courses, so little common vocabulary
has emerged from them. Most lawyers know the difference
between a literal and a purposive reading and most are
familiar with a few canons of interpretation. What I am looking
for, however, is an entirely new vocabulary that would call to
mind familiar problems that one should expect to encounter in
interpreting a statute or a case. The closest analogy I can draw
is Joseph Heller's unforgettable coining of the phrase "Catch
22" to describe the paradox encountered by pilots who could not
be grounded on the basis of mental unfitness unless they so
requested but for whom the filing of a request was proof that
the pilot was mentally fit.47 What would law school teaching be
like if we could identify Catch 23, Catch 24, Catch 25, etc., that
fit the roles of lawyers and judges that we send our students
out to fill?48
Consider first how we might conceptualize this sort of
switch in legal education if we were thinking broadly about
education as a whole. Most sports camps, for example, will
divide classes into various sports-one hour of baseball, one
hour of basketball, one hour of football, etc. In each sport, we
46 For a sterling effort along these lines, see SOiA MENTSCHIKOFF & IRWIN P.
STOTKY, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW (1981).
47 JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 46-47 (1962) (1955).
I have begun work on devising a first year law school curriculum along these
lines and presented my preliminary thoughts under the title "Catch 23 - What Would a
Law Culture and Humanities Curriculum Look Like" in Philadelphia at the 2002
conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and Humanities.
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can almost hear the coach repeating to the players the familiar
refrain, "keep your eyes on the ball." Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more conventionalized expression, and thus as
Winter's teachings would predict, the phrase has become a
metaphorical projection for all sorts of situations in which a
person with a project is urged not to lose sight of the goal.
Purposes are Destinations. No matter how many times coaches
tell us, however, many of us literally find ourselves taking our
eyes off the ball and thus failing to catch it or hit it when it
comes our way. Why? Sometimes we are focusing too much
attention on our own performance (is my swing even?);
sometimes we fear the pain to be inflicted by the oncoming
tackler; sometimes we are thinking ahead to the next act
(passing the ball to the open woman). Imagine then a sports
camp that rearranged itself so that it had a one-hour clinic
called "Keeping Your Eyes on the Ball." In such a clinic,
players would be put in various situations from different sports
and asked to attend to the reasons why they had taken their
eye off the ball at a crucial moment. Each individual might
learn about his or her own tendencies to be distracted and as a
result become a better player in all sports than he or she might
have become by focusing on one sport alone. Perhaps in a world
where sports are fixed, it might make sense to focus only on the
techniques useful in your particular sport. But in law, where
legal categories are constantly shifting, the ability to abstract
conceptual skills of a similar kind might prove enormously
instructive.
In my experience as a law student, the best example of
the attempt to foreground a patterned conceptual issue was
Duncan Kennedy's extensive re-visiting of the age-old conflict
between rules and standards 9 In his terminology, rules are
those legal directives that call upon the decision-maker to
apply them directly with little appeal to the underlying
purposes which led to the adoption of the directive in the first
instance."0  His easiest example involved constitutional
provisions that establish that a person who reaches the age of
eighteen is eligible to vote. In contrast, a legal directive that
49 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
' Id. at 1687-88.
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attempted to resolve the same issue with resort to a standard
might make eligibility to vote rest on whether the potential
voter had reached sufficient maturity to make an informed
choice. Kennedy's classic article then explores some of the basic
conceptual maneuvers with which every lawyer should be
familiar. Rules, for example, tend to be both over and under-
inclusive from the perspective of the underlying purpose at
which they are aimed." Thus, some seventeen year olds are
undoubtedly as mature as most adults and some nineteen year
olds are probably still not to the point where we would respect
their political judgment. Rules, however, have the advantage of
removing some discretion from the decision-maker and thus
creating greater confidence in the objectivity of the law. My
point here is not to rehearse fully a rules/standards analysis
but to use this as an illustration of what law school could move
to the foreground if we took Winter's insights and the phrase
"thinking like a lawyer" seriously.52
I teach the rules/standards dichotomy to my property
students every year and find they remember it better than
almost anything else we cover. My favorite year was when
students pushed to compare the rules/standards debate to an
imaginary one between standards/discretion. In this class, the
proponents of discretion attacked the champions of standards
for rigidly believing that the law or similar written guidelines
should identify in advance those criteria a decision-maker
should use to determine a just outcome. Better, for example, to
run a grant competition in which the funds go to those deemed
(in tautological fashion) "most grantworthy" than to those
whose proposals are the most "inventive and likely to bring
significant change." The latter has the rule-like advantages of
allowing the grant writers to guide their behavior and tailor
their application toward some sort of standard. But what
happens when the granting committee reads a proposal and
finds it neither particularly original nor at all certain to
produce change? As it turns out, though, it is the only
application relating to global warming and the committee now
51 Id. at 1689.
52 For more of my thoughts on this problem see Jeremy Paul, The Politics of
Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L, REV. 1779 (1991) (arguing that Kennedy's only significant
mistake was attempting to link a political valence to each side of the rule/standard
dichotomy).
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concludes this is an area deserving funds. The students point
out that when the world is rapidly changing the seemingly
open-ended standard looks like the closed-ended rule in
comparison to a system that gives even greater discretion to
the decision-maker.
Such conceptual play in class is exactly what I hope to
be encouraging. And I knew I was on safe ground when our
local legal newspaper last fall published an article on real
estate practice by a local attorney that detailed the difference
between rules and standards in terms that would have made
Duncan Kennedy proud. Yet no course in the curriculum as it
now stands is explicitly charged with covering the
rules/standards debate and thus it is haphazard whether
students formally encounter it at all.
The rule/standards debate may appear too simplistic to
warrant calls for its inclusion as anything more than a riff in
the standard property or contracts course. But, of course, the
point, as A Clearing in the Forest so clearly demonstrates, is
that there are almost an infinite number of these sorts of
conceptual patterns built into the project of law. All we have to
do is begin searching. Here's my latest favorite. So far, I am
calling it a "two-fer."
Consider a rule structure that requires a claimant to
make one of two showings in order to gain special favor from
the decision-maker. The example that first came to my
attention is the structure of equal protection doctrine under the
U.S. Constitution as defined by the Supreme Court.53 An
individual who believes she has been discriminated against at
the hands of government has two ways she can get the Court to
take her case seriously. First, she can show that she is a
member of what the Court calls a suspect class. So, for
example, if Texas decided to pay reduced welfare benefits to
people with Spanish surnames to help combat illegal
immigration from Mexico, a Mexican-American woman could
almost certainly receive an injunction prohibiting the state
plan from taking effect. Because national origin is a suspect
5As shall be clear from the text, I owe the example and much of my thinking
on the topic to two creative and conceptually rich articles by Julie Nice. See articles
cited infra note 55. She takes the topic in a different direction from the one pursued
here but it was her work that alerted me to the intrinsic interest in the equal
protection problem the Court faces.
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class the Court would analyze the regulation using strict
scrutiny to determine whether there was a compelling state
interest that was narrowly tailored to meet the state's
objective. Texas could not possibly make such a showing.
Second, a claimant can obtain strict scrutiny if what she
has lost is considered by the Court to be a fundamental right.
So, for example, if New Jersey was fighting overpopulation and
made it a crime for a woman over forty to have a child, a forty-
one year old woman could probably have this statute
invalidated as well. Age is not a suspect class, but the right to
bear children is fundamental. New Jersey's claims that medical
risk goes up at forty would never be enough to show either a
compelling state interest or that the statute was narrowly
tailored.
If, however, a particular claimant can make neither
showing (i.e., neither membership in a suspect class nor loss of
a fundamental right), then the government is typically
permitted to regulate as long as there is a rational relationship
between the line drawn and a legitimate governmental aim.
For example, when the government changed regulations
governing food stamps to withdraw them from workers
displaced as a result of labor strife, the Court found no
constitutional violation.54 The Court has found no fundamental
right to food stamps and displaced workers are not part of any
historically suspect class.
Now comes the fun part. Suppose the Court is asked to
resolve a case in which the group that has suffered has not
been judicially determined to be a suspect class, but the group
has many characteristics that would make it eligible for such a
classification. Moreover, assume that what has been taken
from the affected parties is something very important but not
so significant as to have been found by the Court to be a
fundamental right. In two innovative and wonderful articles,
Julie Nice has noticed just such circumstances present in three
cases where the Court has found an equal protection violation
without finding either a suspect class to be present or a
fundamental right to be taken." She notes that in Romer v.
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection's Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-
Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392 (2000); Julie A. Nice, The Emerging
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Evans6 the Court invalidated an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution without finding either that sexual orientation is a
suspect class or that any fundamental right was lost as a result
of the peculiar provisions preventing municipalities from
adopting anti-discrimination protection for gay citizens. In
Plyler v. Doe," the Court prohibited Texas from denying a
public school education to undocumented immigrants, even
though undocumented aliens have never been held to be a
suspect class and the court had explicitly refused to declare a
fundamental right to an education. And, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.58
the Court found an equal protection violation in Mississippi's
scheme denying an indigent woman who could not afford to pay
for a transcript the right to appeal. The Court, of course, has
never held wealth to be a suspect class. Nor has it held that the
right to a civil appeal is fundamental even in the context where
the underlying issue was the termination of* the woman's
parental rights. What accounts for these decisions?
Professor Nice offers an illuminating explanation,
suggesting that in many cases a class of Americans may be
considered more seriously deprived and thus more worthy of
suspect classification when what has been lost is significant.59
Similarly, she argues that we may care more about a particular
loss if it seems to be something most often taken from a
historically deprived group." As she describes it, rights and
classes are co-constitutive of each other and the Court is
implicitly acknowledging this in the three cases she cites.6'
This accounts, she argues, for an emerging "third strand" in
equal protection cases.6" I find her analysis intriguing and have
no interest in disputing it here.
Instead, I want to generalize from the problem she so
astutely identifies. Let's start with a simple example from
outside the law. Suppose you were on a diet and had two rules
for yourself. One rule was that you would allow yourself a
Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive
Nature ofRights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1209 thereinafter Third Strand].
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
57 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
519 U.S. 102 (1996).
"9 Nice, Third Strand, supra note 55, at 1222-26.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 1226-48.
V Id.
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small dessert after dinner if you had skipped lunch on the
same day. The other was that you would allow yourself dessert
if you had run your typical four miles that day. It is 8 p.m. and
that small bowl of frozen yogurt is quite tempting. You reflect
back on your day and recall that you had a dry bagel, nothing
on it, and black coffee at noontime. You also cut your run short
after 3 miles when it started to rain. May you indulge? At
first blush, of course not. You have not met either standard and
thus no yogurt for you.
If you can stick to this regime, more power to you.
Here's why I'd be likely to partake. In the end, the reason
behind both the no-lunch rule and the four mile requirement is
the same. Lunch puts in calories. Exercise takes them off. Thus
the combination of a light lunch and an almost full workout is
quite likely to be a greater net contribution to weight loss than
either one alone. Even though the rules crafted for the diet are
separate, it would be rather stubborn to insist on keeping them
that way. And since the diet rules are those that I have
probably imposed on myself, I would have little trouble
concluding that coming close twice was good enough. Perhaps
this is why my diets never work.
Can we learn anything from this example that is helpful
to our constitutional law problem? Do the two judicially-
created strands of equal protection analysis fit together in the
same way as diet and exercise? Not exactly. There's no simple
mathematical equation that suggests we can add together the
amount of discrimination suffered by a particular group to the
weight of what has been lost in a particular case to reach a
constitutional conclusion about whether the Equal Protection
Clause has been violated. Certainly, however, we can see why a
court will struggle when facing a case with a claimant who
belongs to a group that is almost a suspect class and who has
lost something almost as important as a fundamental right. On
one hand, there's a strong formalist tendency to tell the
claimant no. Sorry, we can imagine a judge saying, you just
didn't meet either of the required standards. On the other
hand, from a purely conceptual standpoint a court might be
very tempted to look at the case more broadly. If the
government is to be watched more closely when there is a
suspect class and when it takes away something fundamental,
shouldn't it also be watched more closely when the claimant
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gets close on each? Is the formalist or the more conceptual
approach more likely to be adopted by a decision-maker? This
is precisely the kind of question I want to see brought to the
foreground of a good legal education.
Let's look at the same problem again in a different
context to show how familiar it truly is. In my current role as
associate dean, I get all kinds of requests from students
wishing to get the most out of their education. One request I
faced recently hit me, you guessed it, as a "two-fer."
Connecticut rules permit law students to practice before our
courts when properly supervised. To be so certified, students
must "have completed legal studies amounting to at least two
semesters of credit, or the equivalent if the school is on some
basis other than a semester basis except that the dean may
certify a student under this section who has completed less
than two semesters of credit or the equivalent to enable that
student to participate in a faculty-supervised law school
clinical program."  The University of Connecticut runs an
evening division program. Accordingly, we have students who
have completed a full year in this program, and thus two
semesters, but for whom, ordinarily, certification would not be
available because students earn fewer credits during the first
year of the evening program than in the day program.
Our school is also home to a not-for-profit advocacy
group directed by a fabulous attorney who supervises many of
our students. This director is a member of our adjunct faculty,
so work for this advocacy group might constitute a "faculty-
supervised clinical program." Ordinarily, however, I would not
read it this way. If a first-year student wanted to work in this
program, I would conclude that the exception in the
Connecticut practice rules was meant to apply only to our more
formal legal clinics, which in fact are not open to first-year
students.
You probably already see the question. What should I do
with a student who has finished one year in the evening
program, and is thus close on that requirement, and, who
wants to work in our advocacy center, and is thus close on that
one as well? Here the context is different from the diet or even
the constitutional law case. The Court in equal protection cases
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 3-16(a)(2) (1998).
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is following precedent it has set out for itself. As a mid-level
bureaucrat I am bound to follow the dictates of the practice
rules. Would it thus be illegitimate for me to certify the student
on the grounds that she has gotten close on each of two
different requirements?
Clearly the point of requiring two full semesters is
because the drafters wanted to make sure that the student has
enough legal background to function effectively. Clearly the
drafters also believe that a formal program run by a faculty
member might make up for gaps in student background. Isn't it
likely that the fine supervision and careful organization in a
not-for-profit center on our campus will contribute to a good
experience and thus could make up for the minimal gaps
remaining after one full year of school in the evening division?
My guess is that most lawyers would urge me to say no
to these students. More important, I imagine the reaction of
many to this kind of problem would be strong and visceral, but
that this reaction would not readily match some pre-
determined set of ideas about broad political issues. This is
why I agree with Winter that attempting to chart judicial
outcomes by solely looking at classic left/right politics is likely
to prove unsuccessful. Indeed, sometimes I have to shake my
head to remind myself that people who disagree with me
almost violently on issues, such as what to do with "two-fers,"
often are my staunchest allies when it comes to electoral
politics.
I want my students to think through problems such as
the existence of "two-fers" because I know they will encounter
them in practice. My fear is that, in our current curriculum,
students experience comments from professors such as, "Have
you considered the structure of the intellectual problem faced
by the judge?" as flights of frivolity employed to keep them
interested in otherwise dull topics. But there is a lot to be said
in trying to systematize the "two-fer" issue. How did the two
requirements get set up in the first instance? Are they aimed
at producing the same goals? Did the decision-maker consider
and reject a broad standard for grouping all considerations into
a more open-ended balancing test? Will the number of cases
presenting the "two-fer" problem swamp the basic rules? Is
there a meaningful way to cabin the "two-fer" exception within
the particular context? Until and unless we identify such
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issues for students, we are likely to get the same reaction I got
when I told a group at our alumni association that I was
working on the "two-fer" problem and provided a brief
explanation. Quickly the question came back, why would
anyone ever want to say yes just because a claimant had come
close on each of two independent requirements? I was scared to
ask why anyone would ever want to say no?
"Two-fer" problems appear with large stakes as well as
small. Consider this example provided by my colleague Laura
Dickinson. She tells me that under international law, there are
generally two justifications for one state to use force against
another. The first is the right of self-defense under Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. The second is the right to act
(with the approval of the United Nations Security Council)
when there is a threat to international peace and security. Our
case justifying our action against the Taliban might be seen as
falling just short on either one.' Our self-defense case might
falter because we would have trouble showing that a state
actor had effective control over Al-Qaeda in such a way to
justify our attacking that state. Merely having terrorist actors
within a state's territory cannot be enough to give rise to
grounds for attack. Otherwise, countries would be authorized
in attacking each other all over the world. Thus, even if we face
the requisite credible threat from Al-Qaeda to justify self-
defense, we may not face such a threat from any state actor.
Again, with respect to the second grounds for action, a
threat to international peace and security as determined by the
Security Council that justifies the use of force might be
considered close, but not quite. The Security Council issued
several resolutions condemning the attacks and describing
them as a threat to the peace, but did not explicitly authorize
the use of military action in response against the government
of Afghanistan. Is it legitimate for the United States to
combine (note that if I said amalgamate, that would have a
different connotation) these two arguments into one broader
argument to support our actions? Do we now have enough
Let me stress that I am not making any argument about what the best
reading of the legal materials would show. I merely use this as a high stakes example.
Let me stress even more strongly that although this example was provided to me by
Professor Dickinson the views and comments expressed here are mine alone.
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examples of "two-fers" to have made the point that
identification of this sort of thing will contribute to better
lawyering?
Linking back now to A Clearing in the Forest, we can
see why Professor Winter's work, even without his outstanding
contributions from cognitive theory, so powerfully moves us
toward different ways of teaching law. The traditional
curriculum takes its cues from what Winter might describe as
a false search for objectivity. We divide courses based on
doctrinal categories, thereby creating the appearance that the
rules governing judicial decisions stem from certainty within
the materials themselves. If there's a torts controversy, let's all
turn to the law of torts for a "solution." Now, of course, people
don't actually teach torts this way, and much of what I am
suggesting already occurs in our nation's classrooms. But
students who have spent years in courses dividing the world
into categories (math, English, science, history, foreign
language) cannot help themselves in concluding that we mean
to do the same with law school courses. When we emphasize
that the rules versus standards debate, the complexities of
statutory interpretation, or something more idiosyncratic such
as the "two-fer" problem cuts across doctrinal categories, we
hear them muttering under their breath, "That's nice, dear,
now where are we going for dinner?" (or words to that effect).
There is, of course, something even worse than the idea
of our students looking exclusively to the legal materials in
search of concrete solutions. That would be if we spent so much
time teaching across categories that they reached the
conclusion that solutions existed only in the minds of the judge.
As I explained a bit in Part I, I think A Clearing in the Forest
devotes slightly too little time to the familiar ups and downs of
"policy analysis." Judges do sometimes conclude from
indeterminacy within the legal materials that their task is to
fashion a solution that will decrease costs and increase
benefits, or that will reduce administrative burdens. An
individual judge's psychology might be very important in
determining how he or she will make such decisions.
Accordingly, judicial subjectivity is important and quite often it
will be difficult to distinguish such subjectivity from old-
fashioned politics. Everyone knows for example that judges
appointed by Democrats are on the whole more likely to worry
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about anti-discrimination claims while those appointed by
Republicans generally will be concerned with employer
flexibility. But no one needs three years of law school to learn
this.
The challenge as we move forward and continue to learn
from works of cognitive theory such as A Clearing in the Forest
is to determine how to teach law in a way that focuses on the
interaction between the judge and the legal materials. One way
to do so is to identify cognitive riddles, such as the "two-fer"
problem, that judges will face routinely but for which they will
have otherwise developed no formal vocabulary. Some day,
after all, our students will become the judges. If we can teach
them to imagine their situation with the zest for life and for
learning reflected in A Clearing in the Forest, we will have
changed the world. Why haven't we started?
IV. OVERCOMING RESISTANCE: THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
OF DISCIPLINE
I have no conclusive answer explaining the "puzzling
persistence" of the traditional law school curriculum. The
undeniable inertia that troubles all institutions certainly plays
a key role. Teachers who have succeeded along one path for
many years will be understandably reluctant to try another. A
law school that charts a course different from its peers risks
losing students and teachers who are eager to assure
themselves the stature garnered from mastering the
traditional curriculum. And the sheer work involved in
devising a credible alternative curriculum is enough to deter
aspiring reformers in a world where prestige and resources
flow to those who write more rather than those who teach
differently.
Colleagues sympathetic to my project caution me about
a deeper problem. They fear my emphasis on cognitive
structures stresses a kind of abstract reasoning not easily
accessible to a majority of students. I am warned that students
are more comfortable learning about the external world than
they are learning structures of thought or attending to how
their categories of understanding effect what they are learning.
My whole point, however, is that there is nothing unusually
1019
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
abstract about conceptualizing real world problems in terms of
repeated patterns. I have tried to show that patterns of
argument are familiar even to young children. 5 And in Getting
to Maybe, Michael Fischl and I show how even law teachers
who champion the virtues of doctrinal categories in fact test
students on their conceptual skills.6 In that book we develop a
vocabulary that foregrounds the kinds of issues tested by the
conventional exam and treats the doctrinal categories as
merely exemplary of such issues. We have been enormously
gratified by student reaction.
A Clearing in the Forest, however, has led me to develop
a new hypothesis for some of the deep-seated resistance to the
cognitive turn in law. Professor Winter talks often about the
embodied nature of human reason. He stresses the way reason
is portrayed as "cold," "linear," "stiff."7 The mystery, however,
is what people would find appealing about such a rational
function. Aren't we normally drawn to the warm and fuzzy?
Why would we want our legal system to represent a "rigid"
form of reason?
Certainly the appeal of formalism takes us part of the
way there. Law may be most revered by formalists when it
appears to have few rough edges and to give us no choice but to
comply. There is a rational component to our love of rules. We
hope they will protect us against decision-makers
manipulating the system in undesirable ways. But there is also
a spirit for rule-following that goes beyond a grudging respect
for law as a necessary evil. What instead causes people to take
pride in rule-following?
My current assessment is that experiences where we
find ourselves preparing for hardship ground the cognitive
model for this sort of love for the law. What experience is more
counterintuitive, for example, than the "rigors" of basic
training or the "no pain, no gain" mantra of contemporary
exercise? Winter eloquently describes one model of law as
"following the rules" as if they defined the "straight and
narrow" path through life as a journey. Suppose, however, that
the deeper model for "discipline" is that of military or physical
Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988).
6See generally Fischl & Paul, supra note 1.
WINTER, supra note 6, at 58.
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training. This might cause people to be suspicious of all sorts of
teaching and all sorts of law that make it appear as though we
are making things up as we go along. Consider, for example,
the hostility toward scholarly work that does not remain firmly
embedded within a "discipline," which is the very same word
we apply to the rigors of forcing ourselves to get to work in the
first instance. If we followed our immediate physical desires, to
take another example, how could we ever fight through the
pain of a marathon run or the arduous experience of the
obstacle course? When President Bush says we have replaced
the mantra of "if it feels good, do it" with that of "let's roll," he
is playing on deeply held stereotypes about virtue.68 Virtue is
saying no to pleasure for the sake of greater gain. Precisely
this same notion energizes, or as Professor Winter might say,
"motivates" much of the hostility we experience toward those
who prize innovation within law.
Viewing law through the lens of intense physical
training thus reveals another kind of resistance that one would
expect to the idea that cognitive structures form the backbone
of judicial decision-making. One key insight within A Clearing
in the Forest is that there is a sense that judges are making
things up as they go along, even if, as Winter argues so well,
they are constrained in what they can persuasively imagine.
This sense of invention, one which acknowledges
indeterminacy but attempts to chart it systematically, still
stands squarely against the conventional notion of the judge as
merely the object through which the law speaks. It also stands
in opposition to our notion of the citizen constrained to follow
the law no matter what. Such anti-intellectualism would seem
anathema to citizens in a democracy-don't think about what
you are doing, "just do it." But if one thinks of law in the
exercise or basic training context, the whole appeal of law as
rules begins to fall into place. The last thing one usually does
during exercise is to dwell at any given moment on whether it
might make sense to stop.
To make this metaphor stick, of course, I need a two-
step argument. First, I must draw an analogy between the love
of physical discipline (exercise, etc.) and the love of rules. I
68 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan. 29, 2002, available at
http'//www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases/2002/01/20020/29-11.html.
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think this is pretty easy. Remember my earlier example about
losing weight. Who would not feel at least somewhat
comfortable describing the frozen yogurt eater who does not
skip lunch or run four miles as a cheat? If Winter is correct
that many human constructs begin with embodied knowledge,
what better metaphor exists for formal law than the dietary
rules and exercise regimens we encounter in early childhood?
The second step in my argument is somewhat harder.
How does a love of rules translate into a faith in doctrinal
categories as the proper method of teaching? Here I think of
torts and contracts as the intellectual equivalent of push-ups
and sit-ups. They may be good for our (intellectual) muscles
but from them we learn too little. Doctrinal categories hold out
the promise (although, again, no one actually teaches them this
way) that we can master law by learning a few basic concepts
that govern our most fundamental transactions. Compare the
similar goal of trying to build various muscle groups with
repetitive but unreflective exercises. Hard work, but not
necessarily hard thought, is the name of the game.
The introduction of cognitive theory to law presents an
opportunity for a new approach. Winter encourages us to think
about teaching neither as a vehicle for communicating formal
rules nor as an opportunity for examining subjective
intentions. The goal instead is to devise a way of
conceptualizing law that stresses the interactions between the
people who author, interpret, apply, and enforce the law, and
the law as it exists in written form and in the social settings in
which we find ourselves. My own project is to keep working
hard at identifying the cognitive structures of interaction and
using these as a means of teaching my students to think about
the law differently. I don't see them preparing for battle so
much as learning to dance.
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